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Shareholder or Management Rights Plan? 
 
Anastassia Volkova 
This dissertation analyses the market reaction upon the announcement of corporations’ 
intent to adopt a poison pill, in Canada and in the United States. The two neighbouring 
countries have different takeover landscapes and dissimilar regulatory requirements faced 
by targets in light of the defense adoption. Two hypotheses are put forward in this study: 
the managerial entrenchment and the shareholders’ wealth maximization. Data on all 
poison pill announcements between January 1
st
, 1983 and December 31
st
, 2010 was 
collected, yielding 672 and 8,862 Canadian and U.S. announcements, respectively. Event 
study methodology was employed to identify the existence of market reaction around the 
announcement news. Empirical results support the shareholders’ wealth maximization 
hypothesis for both the U.S. and the Canadian sample characterized by significantly 
positive cumulative abnormal returns during the event window, with the Canadian sample 
demonstrating more positive abnormal returns. Additionally, the U.S. sample of issuing 
companies is examined further and a transition from a negative market reaction in the 
early 1980s to significantly positive abnormal returns in 1990s and 2000s is documented. 
A multiple regression analysis revealed that the proportion of institutional investors in 
target firms announcing the adoption of poison pills positively benefited the target by 
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Poison pills, also referred to as shareholder rights plans, are a form of antitakeover 
defence tactic that became widely used by corporations since their introduction by a U.S. 
corporate lawyer, Martin Lipton, in 1982. Since their inception and the affirmation of 
their legality by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985, their use grew throughout the 
world and made its way into a corporate landscape of many American and international 
corporations. The primary motivation for the shareholder rights plans’ adoption was to 
“provide a target board with negotiating leverage in the face of a hostile takeover 
attempt” (Bab & Neenan, 2011).  One of the first countries following the example of the 
United States was Canada. The first poison pill was introduced to Canadian financial 
markets by Inco Limited (ticker: N) in October, 1988. The pill immediately sparked the 
debate between critics and proponents of the mechanism and continues to trouble the 
financial world up until today. The proponents of this dilatory measure believe that it is a 
well-built defense against coercive tactics as it " discourages hostile bids, and if one is 
made, they force the bidder to negotiate with the target's board of directors and permit the 
board to obtain a higher price for shareholders by allowing it to initiate an auction for 
corporate control" (Coleman, 1988). As the result, poison pills are believed to increase 
shareholders' wealth. Conversely, their opponents consider that a poison pill is a 
managerial entrenchment device giving incumbent managers the power to deter hostile 
bids and preserve managerial tenure for their own benefits, with their abusive actions 





There remains no dominant view on the motivation behind the adoption of shareholder 
rights plans.  Nevertheless, their importance in global financial markets needs not to be 
understated. It is believed that the introduction of these widespread defense tactics played 
an important role in ending the merger wave of the 1980s (Hebb & MacLean, 2006).  
A poison pill can be viewed as a call option which gives the shareholders of the target 
firm the right to purchase shares of common stock, in a target or acquiring firm, at a 
significant discount. The discount usually accounts for 50% off the market price. These 
special rights can be exercised by a triggering event, such as the accumulation of 
specified percentage of target shares by the acquirer or the announcement of a tender 
offer.  Furthermore, they can take on different forms; nevertheless, their ultimate goal is 
to prevent hostile raiders from taking control of the target firm. The greater the difference 
between the market and the exercise price, the more dilutive is the pill. As such, the main 
objective of this anti-takeover defense is to impose a significant "dilution" on the hostile 
acquirer, increase the potential cost of acquisition and encourage the corporate raider to 
negotiate the terms and conditions with the target board of directors (Bruner, 1991).  
There exist different types of poison pills, such as flip-in, back-end and flip-over pills, 
among many others. Flip-in pills enable shareholders to purchase target's shares, once the 
pill is triggered, at a considerable discount. On the other hand, flip-over pills grant 
shareholders with the special rights to purchase bidder's shares at a discount. More 
specifically, these rights enable them to purchase discounted shares in a merged firm. 
Back-end pills allow the holders of the pill to exchange their shares for a price that the 





Poison pills have proven to be a robust takeover defense tactic introduced as a response 
to innovative and coercive financing techniques discriminating among target company's 
shareholders, one of the instruments being the two-tier, front-end loaded bid. By the end 
of 1980s more than a thousand American organizations had adopted the defense plan. In 
Canada, takeover activity was and remains less common, yet a significant number of 
organizations choose to institute anti-takeover amendments to protect themselves against 
hostile raids. Despite the close geographic proximity, legal and regulatory environments 
in the United States and Canada are subject to much dissimilarity. In the United States, 
directors can adopt poison pills without shareholders' consent, however, they need to 
justify that they are doing it in the best interest of the shareholders and not for their own 
entrenchment. In Canada, rights plans are also well established and share many common 
features with their U.S. neighbours, yet some radical differences do exist. First, the 
questions whether a poison pills can continue to be deployed in the face of a hostile bid is 
dealt with by provincial securities regulators, as a matter of securities regulatory laws, not 
in court as a matter of corporate law concerning the division of powers between 
shareholders and directors. Additionally, in contrast to United States, where takeover bid 
decisions are made by the incumbent management, Canadian securities regulatory law 
requires target shareholders to decide “whether to entertain a hostile acquisition 
proposal”. Interestingly enough, target management of U.S. corporations having a 
shareholder rights plan in place has a right to simply refuse the offer, while in Canada the 
question of change of control is inevitable and it is just a matter of time it takes to elicit a 
better bid. However, recent decisions taken by provincial courts risk to initiate a 





Due to a wide specter of differences between American and Canadian regulations in 
respect to the defense mechanisms, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the 
motivations behind the adoption of shareholder rights plans could be affected by these 
dissimilarities. This study is unique in that it contrasts and compares the use and the 
market impact of poison pill announcements in the United States and Canada. 
Furthermore, to my knowledge, it is the only study encompassing such a long period and 
large sample of companies that have announced their intent to adopt the defense measure 
between 1982 and 2010. Additionally, no recent studies have been conducted to contrast 
the market reaction to poison pills adoption in both the American and Canadian markets.  
Prior literature focusing on shareholder rights plans reaches controversial conclusions. 
Early U.S. studies analysing the adoption of the defense plans in 1980s demonstrate a 
negative market reaction to the announcement news, thus providing support for the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis, while other studies find no significant market 
reaction upon the announcement of poison pills. Canadian literature dealing with poison 
pills is far less abundant. Bizjak, Case and Mahajan (2000), show that Canadian firms 
experience an insignificantly positive abnormal return of 0.21% upon the adoption of 
poison pills.   
The empirical results demonstrated in this study reveal that a difference in market 
reaction upon announcement news exists between the Canadian and the U.S. landscape. It 
is shown that Canadian companies adopting a poison pill exhibit more positive abnormal 
returns upon announcement news than their American counterparts. This is largely 
explained by a more shareholders friendly environment in Canada, where decisions are 





United States. Furthermore, a shift from negative market reaction in the early 1980s to 
positive market reactions in 1990s and 2000s is observed for U.S. target companies 
announcing the adoption of defense measures. This swing can be partially explained by 
an increasing number of institutional investors in these firms, giving rise to more control 
and scrutiny of the management team.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the literature 
review; section 3 defines and describes different forms of poison pill defenses. The 
following section 4 puts forward the opposing hypothesis tested in this study. Section 5 
and 6 concentrate on data collection and methodology. The remaining part focuses on the 
empirical results.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. U.S. Market 
 A number of U.S. studies analyzing the impact of the adoption of poison pills was 
conducted in the late 1980's, scrutinizing the new phenomenon in the M&A field. Two 
opposing theories were put forward to explain the reaction of stock prices to the pill 
announcement: the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and the shareholders' wealth 
maximization hypothesis (Ryngaert, 1988; Malatesta and Walking, 1988; Strong and 
Meyer, 1990). The managerial entrenchment hypothesis states that management may 
initiate a pill defense for their benefits, to prevent a change in control, consequently 
having a negative impact on the share price. On the other hand, the shareholders interest 





by increasing the takeover premium. In this scenario, the adoption of the pill is predicted 
to be accompanied by an increase in stock price of the target company. 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1986) were among the first authors to document the impact of poison 
pill adoption on the issuing company's stock price. By dividing the sample companies 
into two distinct groups, based on takeover speculation activity, the authors' empirical 
results succeed in demonstrating the existence of a statistically significant difference in 
the price reaction of two groups. For firms with no takeover speculations the effect of the 
adoption announcement is zero, while the sample subject to takeover activity 
demonstrates significantly negative abnormal returns around the event, thus rejecting the 
shareholders' wealth maximization hypothesis.  
Despite the widespread use of the defense tactics, most of the American literature 
documents a negative impact of the adoption on shareholders' wealth, thus supporting the 
managerial entrenchment theory. Ryngaert (1988) examines a sample of 380 firms that 
announced the adoption of poison pills between January 1982 and December 25, 1986. 
The empirical results reveal that upon the adoption news, company's stock price 
demonstrated a negative response with an average abnormal return being -0.03%, when 
an entire sample is considered. In addition, Ryngaert shows that firms that successfully 
prevented hostile takeovers by initiating poison pill defenses suffered a decline of 
14.42%, on average, in the six months following the defeat. More importantly, the author 
distinguishes between many types of these defense tactics and argues that not all pills 
entrench management, but only the most restrictive versions of these defenses negatively 





Similar to other studies during the late eighties, Malatesta and Walking (1988) examine 
the effects of poison pill implementation on shareholders' wealth as well as the 
characteristics of firms that decide to adopt these antitakeover defence mechanisms. The 
results obtained from analysing a sample of 118 cases from December 1982 through 
March 1986, reveal a significant decrease in stockholders' wealth upon the 
announcement, thus ruling in favor of the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. The 
authors additionally demonstrate that firms adopting a pill are more likely to have been or 
become subject to takeover activity than the non-adopting counterparts. They also report 
interesting results in regard to publications in which the announcement appears. The 
authors demonstrate that the more popular the source of publication is, such as the Wall 
Street Journal or the New York Times, the more negative would be the impact of the 
announcement on shareholder's wealth. 
Strong and Meyer (1990) further examined the adoption of shareholder right plans by 146 
corporations and their effect on security prices. They demonstrate that firms, which 
experienced control-related changes within six months following the adoption, 
experienced a 2.73% increase on average, in the month prior to the adoption. A possible 
explanation of a significant rise in stock prices could be the takeover speculations taking 
place during that period. Conversely, the adoption of a poison pill was found to trigger a 
2.06% decline in stock prices, leading to a conclusion that poison pills are managerial 
entrenchment devices. Additional analysis revealed that if changes in control or 
restructuring were to take place after the defense adoption, it would be accompanied by 
positive returns subsequent the event. An event study of the control group, including 





results. The announcement effects were found to be somewhat negative, but not 
statistically significant. In the six months prior to the announcement, average market-
adjusted returns suffered a decline of 3.0%. In addition, in the six months subsequent to 
the event, the average cumulative effect was found to be -4.5%. Nevertheless, it is 
reported that exactly half of the companies experienced positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement date. 
2.2 Canadian Market 
The Canadian takeover defense landscape differs from the U.S. environment in several 
ways. The current Canadian regime views shareholder rights plans as temporary 
measures allowing a target company to seek value-maximizing alternatives to a hostile 
bid, thus making a change in control a matter of time rather than a choice. In contrast to 
the U.S., where challenges associated with shareholder rights plans and the separation of 
control between shareholders and management are scrutinized by the courts, in Canada 
the responsibilities for controlling the use of defense tactics are laid upon provincial 
securities regulators. Furthermore, in Canada, in contrast to the U.S. where the decisions 
can be undertaken by target management without shareholders’ approval, the adoption 
decisions are made by the target shareholders. This discrepancy between the two 
neighbouring countries’ regimes may be the founding stone explaining the difference in 
the abnormal returns upon the defense announcements. 
Unlike a great popularity of poison pills in the American literature of the last century, 
Canadian studies focusing on these anti-takeover defenses are less common. Studies of 
the share price reaction to the adoption of poison pills demonstrate opposing results than 





Mahajan, 2000, show that Canadian firms experience an insignificantly positive abnormal 
return of 0.21% upon the adoption of poison pills. The differing reactions of Canadian 
and American markets to the adoption of the anti-takeover tactics are the result of 
existing differences in the structure of poison pills and their regulatory environment. 
A study by Hebb and MacLean (2006) concentrates entirely on the Canadian market and 
aims at understanding whether the adoption of poison pills has an impact on the financial 
performance of Canadian corporations. Thirty publicly traded Canadian firms that 
adopted poison pills between the years of 1988 and 1995 were considered. When 
examining the operating income, empirical results indicate insignificant positive changes 
in each of the five years following the adoption, thus concluding that the adoption of anti-
takeover defense tactics by Canadian corporation had no significant effect on their 
performance. In fact, the analysis of all other ratios lends support to the "hypothesis that 
poison pills do little to affect management decision-making". Drastically different results 
are reached by Johnson & Rao (1997) in their study of the impact of poison pill defenses 
on the financial performance of American corporations. In the conducted experiment, the 
authors analyse the influence of anti-takeover amendments " on four major aspects of 
managerial decision-making: earning power, expenses, investment, and capital structure". 
Despite the conclusion pointing to the overall lack of negative impact of anti-takeover 
amendments on the performance of the organization, the authors find an increase in debt 
structure of the organization upon the adoption of poison pills leading to a significant 
decrease in the net income ratios. Hebb and MacLean (2006) believe that a few 
dissimilarities obtained in the two studies are mainly due to the existing differences 





3. The Description of Poison Pills 
Poison pills are highly controversial developments of financial market of the 20th 
century. Although these securities can take on various shapes and coatings, the main 
ingredients are fairly the same. The mechanisms aim at economically “poisoning” 
determined and control-seeking raiders and protect the company from innovative 
discriminatory take-over bids. A poison pill is defined by Ryngaert (1988) as “any 
financial device that is triggered by a particular action of an acquirer and results in the 
assumption of unwanted financial obligations by an acquirer, dilution of an acquirer's 
equity holdings or loss of the acquirer's voting rights."  The shareholders' rights cannot be 
detached from the shares; neither can they be exercised before the triggering event. The 
triggering event usually occurs under two circumstances: an acquiring party must get 
hold of a predefined percentage of common shares (usually varying from 20% to 50%) or 
a specified number of days must elapse after a raider has launched a take-over bid 
designed to acquire the defined percentage (Dey & Yalden, 1990-1991). There are four 
main types of poison pills adopted by American and Canadian corporations: (1) preferred 
stock plans, also referred to as original plans, (2) flip-over plans, (3) back-end plans and 
(4) voting plans. 
3.1. Preferred stock plans  
The first movers in the adoption of poison pills were documented to employ the preferred 
stock plans. Under this scenario, a dividend of convertible preferred stock is issued to all 
common stockholders of the potential target. Similarly to holders of common stock, 
preferred stock holders are entitled to voting rights, translated into one vote per share. 





the cost associated with the preferred dividend, the preferred dividend is increased, thus 
motivating the stockholders to continue holding the preferred stock instead of converting 
it to common. Upon the triggering of the event (raider acquiring a substantial position, 
usually between 20% and 50% of common stock), holders are entitled to redeem their 
preferred stock for cash  "at the highest price the acquirer paid for the firm's common or 
preferred stock in the past year" (Ryngaert, 1988), unless a merger occurs within a short, 
predefined period of time. In the event of a merger, the rights can be exchanged for the 
acquirer’s voting securities, of the same value. The raider in search of corporate control 
may encounter a number of substantial problems if its target has a preferred stock plan 
under its sleeve. If the redemption of preferred shares were to occur, it would have a 
drastically negative impact on acquirer's wealth. There exists a positive correlation 
between the tender price and the preferred stock redemption value and a negative relation 
with acquirer's wealth. Thus, the higher the tender price, the higher the redemption value 
would be and more losses the raider will suffer. As a result, the existence of these rights 
would most likely discourage corporate raiders. 
3.2. Flip-over plans 
Flip-over plans entitle the company to issue shareholders rights allowing for the purchase 
of its own securities, usually preferred or common stock, at an exercisable price set far 
beyond its market value. These newly issued rights cannot be exercised until 
approximately 10-14 days after the raider has acquired or made a bid to acquire a 
substantial position. Following the accumulation of a predefined triggering amount of 
targets' common stock, the rights become exercisable. They are then separated from 





acquiring parties contemplating a takeover. In the event of a change in control, the right 
holders can purchase shares in the new company at a significant discount, in some cases 
reaching 90%, thus making a merger fairly expensive. In some cases, a large shareholder 
may simply forego the acquisition by first acquiring the control of target company and 
then transferring target's assets. This approached is referred to as "self-dealing". Yet 
throughout the years, target companies have found ways to prevent these manipulations 
by adopting a self-dealing flip-in clause. In this case, "right holders could purchase target 
stock at a substantial discount, thus partially expropriating the block holder's equity in the 
target" (Malatesta & Walking, 1988).  
Another clause that the target company may decide to adopt is the ownership flip-in 
clause. This provision allows right holders to buy target stock at a significant discount if 
the acquirer accumulates a stock amount in excess of the predetermined threshold 
(usually between 20% and 50% of company's common stock). Consequently, the 
acquiring party's rights become void and its equity is diluted.  
3.3. Back-end plans 
Similarly to flip-over plans, back-end plans entitle shareholders of the adopting company 
with redeemable rights exchangeable for cash or securities with a value exceeding the 
current stock price. The triggering event allowing the rights to be exercised occurs upon 
the acquiring party's accumulation of a substantial amount of target's shares. The rights 
are exchangeable for a back-end price predetermined by the board of directors and found 





3.4. Voting plans 
These specific rights are found to be the most straightforward by Malatesta and Walking 
(1988), in that they aim at preventing a single party from gaining control of the target 
firm. In this scenario, the firm issues a preferred stock with voting rights similar to all 
common stock holders. If one party is to accumulate a predefined ownership threshold, 
preferred holders, except the acquiring party, would be entitled to supervoting privileges. 
As a result, the acquirer's vote rights would decrease and he would be prevented from 
exercising voting control.  
3.5. Poison Pills in United States and Canada 
With the structure of poison pills continuously evolving, it is salient to mention that 
different regulatory environments observed in the United States and Canada favour the 
use of diverse types of poison pills. In fact, a relatively new development, according to 
Dey and Yalden (1990) that has taken a big spin in the Canadian corporate landscape is 
the permitted bid provision. The provision allows the acquiring party to bypass the target 
management and to negotiate directly with target shareholders. “It requires that the bid 
then be accepted by a majority of the shares not owned by the bidder to avoid triggering a 
flip-in" (Dey & Yalden, 1990-1991). While the permitted bid provision is widely used by 
Canadian organizations similarly to the U.S., the procedures that deal with the defense 
mechanisms have their dissimilarities.  
One of the main differences between the two neighbouring countries is the power to 
control the use of the deterrence mechanism. In the United States incumbent management 





the decision power lies with target firm's shareholders. In fact, in the United States nearly 
all plans were adopted by incumbent management without shareholders’ approval or 
government intervention. Conversely, Canadian government grants shareholders with the 
power of decision concerning anti-takeover defenses and reserves itself the right to 
confront any organization adopting poison pills without shareholders' approval. Hebb and 
Maclean (2006) mention that approximately 76% of all Canadian organization adopting a 
poison pill seek shareholder approval, while the proportion of American firms pursuing a 
similar strategy is far less overwhelming.  
Another important difference between the regulatory tactics in regard of the defense 
mechanisms is the target's rights to refuse to come to a bargaining table with corporate 
raiders. U.S. boards of directors are granted with the ability to refuse the offers from 
potential acquirers by "just saying no". Yet, the board has to stand ready to prove that it 
does not breach its fiduciary duty by refusing to negotiate with the raider and its decision 
is in the best interest of its company's shareholders. In some circumstances, a court may 
conclude that the board's decision is inadequate and prevents shareholders from 
responding to a wealth maximizing bid. On the other hand, in Canada, the pill serves 
simply as a delaying tactic which allows the incumbent management to seek out value 
maximizing alternatives to a hostile bid (Raglan, Gray, & Tory, 2011). More specifically, 
"a Canadian board of directors cannot just say no, thus once a Canadian target company 
is put in play, a change in control transaction is likely to occur" (Osler, 2011). 
Consequently, Canadian boards can be portrayed as agents, seeking the most wealth 





Since U.S. management has the ability to issue a poison pill without shareholder consent 
and can reject any offer made by the acquiring parties, many opponents  believe that the 
defenses are adopted in management's best interest that often diverge with shareholders' 
benefits. On the other hand, the Canadian regime being less lenient towards the 
incumbent management is considered to benefit the shareholders of the target company 
which decide to institute the defense mechanism.  
It is also worthwhile noting that the market for corporate control in the United States is 
extremely large; in fact from January 1, 1982 to January 1, 2011, 4,681 companies had 
adopted 8,874 poison pills. The takeover market in Canada is far less abundant than in 
the United States with 481 companies adopting 674 poison pills from January 1, 1988 to 
January 1, 2011. Dey and Yalden (1990-1991) have demonstrated two reasons for that 
phenomenon: the share-ownership profile and the takeover bid regime. The authors show 
that in 1983, approximately 80% of the companies that traded on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange had a shareholder with legal or effective control, thus allowing only 20% of the 
publicly traded companies to become a potential target. 
In Canada, provincial security regulators are responsible for dealing with the proper 
conduct of takeover bids and poison pill defenses, as opposed to the United States where 
securities legislation falls within federal jurisdiction, where the court's main focus is the 
division of power between shareholders and the board of directors. The National Policy 
No. 38 issued in 1986 and the subsequently issued National Policy 62-2002 aim to 
protect the bona fide interests of target shareholders in Canada and have influenced the 
decisions of various Canadian securities commissions.  The takeover bid regime in 





acquisition tactics, such as two-tier front-end loaded bid, and has promoted equal and fair 
treatment of target shareholders. Despite the code's aim at equal shareholders treatment it 
fails to provide a guarantee that shareholders will receive a fair offer in a time allocated 
to them. For instance, the Ontario Securities Act code" prohibits all post-bid acquisitions 
during a 20-day period after the bid" (Dey & Yalden, 1990-1991), thus providing target 
shareholders with only 21 days to bring any interested parties to the bargaining table and 
reach a wealth maximizing agreement.  
A few recent destabilizing decisions made by Alberta Securities Commission (ASC) and 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) had taken an unexpected departure from the 
traditional Canadian approach. More specifically, the Pulse Data and the subsequent Neo 
Materials cases demonstrated that the provincial securities commissions allowed a poison 
pill to remain in place for an extended period of time, " thereby suggesting that it was no 
longer a question of when, but if the poison pills will be terminated" (McGlaughlin, 
2012), a decision that took an astonishing swing towards the U.S. approach.  
4. Hypotheses 
In line with previous academic research on poison pills, two opposing hypotheses are put 
forward in order to analyse the impact that the announcement of poison pills has on the 
adopting company's share price. The shareholder rights agreements have been spurring a 
heated debate from all sides on whether they facilitate or hamper shareholders' wealth 
maximization. Critics argue that poison pills make hostile takeovers too costly, denying 
shareholders the appropriate premiums for their transactions and thus entrenching the 





obtain the best possible offer for shareholders in control transactions. Management 
continuously claim that shareholders' wealth maximization is their primary purpose when 
adopting the defense instruments. Nevertheless, the opponents believe that managers 
purposely misstate their true motivations and contend that pills are adopted to serve their 
personal goals. Thus, the two hypothesis put forward in the study are: the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis and the shareholders interest hypothesis. 
4.1 Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis 
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis accentuates the conflict of interest arising 
between the incumbent management and the firm's shareholders when the takeover could 
lead to a potential displacement of the management team or a loss in compensation. In 
cases where management feels that the takeover could result in a loss of their benefits, it 
may decide to adopt the defense mechanism despite the value increasing changes in 
control. It is argued that the benefits of adopting a defense mechanism have to be higher 
than the costs associated with the procedure. Managers that have a large percentage of 
stock ownership could be reluctant at adopting the pill, due to its negative impact on the 
share price.  Thus, under the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, during the adoption 
decision, the benefits associated with “reducing the probability of a takeover" should 
always outweigh the costs the incumbent management bears due to stock price decline. 
Since markets are believed to be efficient and rational, all available information will be 
immediately incorporated into stock prices. As a result, under the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis, the announcement of poison pill’s adoption should be 
accompanied by a decline in shareholders' wealth, leading to a downward plunge of the 





In the United States the decision behind the poison pill defense adoption lies with the 
directors and is rarely subjected to shareholder vote, implying that the plans can be 
adopted without shareholders' approval, possibly for wrongful motives serving 
managerial interests. Consequently, it could be hypothesized that the announcement news 
will be associated with a negative stock price return for the sample of U.S. companies. 
4.2 Shareholders' wealth maximization Hypothesis 
The shareholders' interest or otherwise known as the shareholder's wealth maximization 
hypothesis supports the idea that company's managers engage in control transactions that 
would maximize the value shareholders receive in exchange for their shares. In this 
scenario, the pill is adopted in order to negotiate value maximizing deals for the 
stockholders and secure higher control premium in an event of a takeover. It is therefore 
assumed that firms with poison pills are successful at obtaining higher premium paid in 
takeovers. In the United States where two-tier takeovers are possible, the pill can act as a 
deterrent mechanism to prevent shareholders from selling their shares at a lower price 
than could be otherwise obtained in the process.  When two-tier takeovers are possible, 
shareholders could be caught up in a prisoner's dilemma. Thus, poison pills could be used 
against two-tier of partial  tender offers for control and enable managers to act as agents 
in negotiating wealth maximizing deals for their company's stockholders. 
Oppositely to the regulations in the United States, Canadian security law regulators 
allocate the decision power concerning the adoption of poison pills to firm's shareholders. 
In fact, in Canada once a company receives a takeover bid, the change in control is 
almost unavoidable, thus eliminating any possibility of managerial entrenchment. 





are in line with shareholders' interest and thus support the wealth maximization 
hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, the announcement event should be accompanied by 
increase in target firm's stock price.  
5. Data Collection 
Data on all poison pills issued between January 1
st
, 1983 and December 31
st
, 2010 was 
collected for American and Canadian corporations. A total of 672 poison pill 
announcements by Canadian organizations and 8,862 poison pill announcements by 
American companies were documented. The first U.S. poison pill was introduced by 
Martin Lipton, a well-known takeover defender in December 1982. In Canada, this 
defense strategy arrived a few years later, in October 1988 when first used by Inco 
Limited and instantaneously sparked a heated debate on the conduct of target companies 
in the face of a hostile bid. 
Out of the total number of poison pill announcements, 452 were first time plans adopted 
in Canada and 4,238 first issue poison pills adopted in the United States. A significant 
number of companies in the U.S. were classified as second-time adopters, which either 
replaced or extended the pill scheduled to expire.  
All poison pill cases were retrieved from Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions database along with the announcement and adoption dates. Table 1 contains 
information on the shareholder rights plans sample. In 12 U.S. cases, the adoption date 
and the tender offer date were less than two weeks apart, thus the tender offer event could 
have had an impact on the abnormal returns associated with the announcement event. In 





for which the adoption and the tender offer date are less than 14 days apart. The same 
exercise is performed on the Canadian sample, where 2 events are removed.  
Table 2 and 2a demonstrate the total number of poison pills announced during each year 
in the sample period.  In the United States nearly 44% of total number of defenses in the 
sample are announced from 1990 to 1999, while in Canada most of the events occurred 
from 2000 to 2010, nearly 82%. Compared to the United States, only 1.34% of poison 
pill announcements took place in the 1980s, while 20.45% of the events occurred in the 
United States during the same time period. This discrepancy can be explained by the 
earlier introduction of poison pill defenses in the U.S. financial markets with the first one 
being adopted in early 1983 as opposed to the first Canadian pill being adopted by Inco in 
1988.  
The event study for the United States cases was conducted using the Eventus Software 
from Wharton Research Data Services, where the daily returns for all companies in the 
sample were obtained from Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. 
Daily returns for the Canadian sample were obtained from the CFMRC/TSX database. 
Stock prices for companies missing in the database were obtained from Yahoo Finance. 
Return data was calculated using daily closing prices adjusted for stock splits and 
dividends. As a proxy for Canadian market portfolio, the daily return on the S&P/TSX 
Composite index was used.  In line with previous empirical tests, the market model 
technique is used to estimate abnormal returns on the announcement day. The estimation 
period is set to 255 trading days and ends 46 days before the event date, thus eliminating 





In order to conduct the analysis of takeover activity following the poison pill adoption, all 
disclosed and undisclosed M&A transactions and specifically tender offer transactions 
were obtained from Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database 
for all American and Canadian companies that have adopted a poison pill within the 
studied period. Other types of transactions, including leverage buyouts, exchange offers, 
spinoffs, self-tenders, etc. were excluded from the analysis. 
6. Event Study Methodology 
To test the two contrasting theories, the managerial entrenchment and the shareholders 
wealth maximization hypotheses, an event study methodology is employed to capture the 
initial market reaction to the announcement of shareholder rights plans by U.S. and 
Canadian targets. 
This method is widely used by academics and practitioners and can be also employed in 
order to test the market efficiency hypothesis which states that all available information is 
incorporated into stock prices in a timely manner. Assuming markets are rational, the 
effect of the event will be reflected in security prices immediately, the short-term study 
will therefore be sufficient to analyse whether the pill is a wealth maximizing or 
dismantling tool. For each firm included in the sample an event window that captures the 
announcement effect is identified. Day t=0 represents the date of the announcement of an 
intent to adopt a poison pill by the target company. As previously mentioned, under the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the announcement or the adoption of the poison pill 
is associated with a decline in stock price, thus demonstrating that management can 





Conversely, the shareholders' wealth maximization theory implies an increase in stock 
return upon the announcement or adoption of the defense measure. 
6.1. Event Windows and Estimation Period 
Event window determines the period length (measured in days) over which the abnormal 
return associated with the event os measured. If the chosen event window is too long, we 
may not be able to capture the impact of the specific event. It is important to examine 
whether the mean abnormal returns for the periods around the event are equal to zero. For 
instance, if the event is anticipated, some abnormal returns associated with the event in 
question can be detected in the pre-event period. It is also salient to consider the day after 
the announcement because information might have been released after the market close 
and reached the shareholders just then. Due to that phenomenon, the information will be 
reflected in the prices the following day.  
It is also crucial to test for market efficiency, and more specifically how quickly the 
information revealed at the time of the event is incorporated into the stock prices. If 
nonzero abnormal returns are found in the post-event periods, this will constitute the 
evidence for market inefficiency and give rise to a profitable trading strategy.   
The estimation period used in the study is set to 255 trading days and ends 46 days before 
the event date in order to eliminate any effects that may be associated with the event 
itself.  
6.2. Abnormal returns calculations 
To examine the effect of the announcement of the adoption of poison pills, the abnormal 





as the difference between the actual and expected returns, where expected returns are 
normal returns under the consideration that the event did not take place. Therefore, 
abnormal return is considered to be a measure of the change in shareholders' wealth 
associated with the event. The following formula is used to calculate abnormal returns 
(following the methodology of Kothari & Warner, 2006).  
 eit = Rit - Kit (1) 
Where eit is the abnormal return of stock i on time t, Rit  is the actual return of stock i on 
time t and Kit is the expected return of stock i on time t.  
In order to estimate the expected returns on a security, the market model is used. In 
addition, both equally weighted and value weighted indices, representing the market 
returns, are used to test for the robustness of the results. The market model states that the 
return on security is dependent on the returns of the market portfolio. The extent to which 
the variation in actual returns is captured by the returns of market portfolio is measured 
by β. The market model is: 
 Ri,t= αi + βRm,t + εit   (2) 
 Where E(εit )=0 and Var [εit] = σ
2  
(3) 
Where Ri,t is the expected return on security i  on time t; Rm,t is the return of the market 
portfolio and εit  is the error term. 
The cumulative average residual method (CAR) is used to obtain the abnormal 





defined as the sum of the abnormal returns for the total period in the event window is 
calculated using the following formula: 
 CARi =ARi;t+1 + ... + ARi; t2 (4) 
From this formula, it follows that the cumulative average abnormal return is: 
     
 
 
∑            (5) 
In order to check for the robustness of the results, the market- adjusted model is used, 
once again making use of both equally-weighted and value-weighted indices. The model 
calculates above market returns using the following formula: 
     ARit= Rit - Rmt.        (6) 
6.3. Statistical tests 
The Patell Z test as well as the sign test is conducted in this event study, in order to 
capture the results of both parametric and non-parametric tests in determining the 
statistical significance of mean cumulative abnormal returns. Parametric tests, such as the 
Patell Z test, rely on the assumption that individual firms' abnormal returns are normally 
distributed. The rank test is a non-parametric test that enables us to account for the 
magnitude of abnormal returns; however, it does not require the normal distribution 





7. Empirical Analysis and Results 
7.1. Stock Price Reaction to Poison Pill Announcement 
7.1.1. U.S. Entire Sample Analysis 
The entire U.S. sample comprises of 8,862 events of poison pill announcement from 
January 1, 1983 to January 1, 2011. A total of 932 security events were dropped due to 
lack of return data and 12 events were disregarded due to the presence of confounding 
tender offer events, leaving 7,918 useable events. A market model along with the value-
weighted index is used to test the hypotheses. Table 3 presents excess returns for the 
sample of U.S. poison pill announcements with Panel A displaying the results for all U.S. 
issues. For 7,918 events, the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 2.57% with a 
t-statistic of 35.62 for a 3 days window centered on the announcement event. Firms’ 
positive excess returns associated with poison pill adoption news support the 
shareholders’ wealth maximization hypothesis, arguing that the pill increases 
management’s bargaining power in response to takeover bids, thus allowing the target to 
search for a higher control premium with the ultimate purpose of maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth. These results are contrary to the findings of the early literature 
focusing on the adoption of poison pills by American corporations. As previously noted, 
negative CARs are observed for the early adopters suggesting the presence of managerial 
entrenchment (Ryngaert, 1988, Malatesta and Walking, 1988). Yet, these studies focused 
on analysing the effect of poison pills adopted in the early 1980s; therefore, an analysis of 
market reaction during different time periods is necessary to explain a shift in market 





and significant at a 0.001 level. Panel B presents the results solely for first-time U.S. 
issues. The sample size is reduced to 3,780 adopting companies and the associated 
cumulative abnormal returns are found to be less than for the entire sample. For a 3 days 
event window, centered on the announcement, the mean cumulative abnormal return is 
0.63% with a corresponding t-statistic of 5.493.  Yet again, the strongly positive results 
demonstrate a powerful support for the shareholders’ wealth maximization hypothesis. 
For the sample of second-time issuers, demonstrated in Panel C, strongly positive excess 
returns of 4.34% (t-value= 43.007) are associated with the event. According to Johnson & 
Meade (1996), if the pill was adopted after the target firm had any anti-takeover 
amendments in place the market has already “impounded its assessment of the cost of 
management entrenchment into the stock price at the time of the initial defense 
adoption”. Furthermore, the authors document an existence of a statistically significant 
difference between two groups of companies, with targets with no prior anti-takeover 
defenses having more negative reactions. Consequently, in our case, we can confirm that 
companies adopting a poison pill for the second time are subject to more positive 
abnormal returns upon the announcement event.  
7.1.2. U.S. Sub-Periods Analysis 
To understand whether negative excess returns were in fact associated with early 
adopters, average excess returns for firms announcing poison pill defenses from January 
1983 to March 1986 are measured, replicating the same period used in the Malatesta and 
Walking study. For a total of 127 firms, I find that the 5 days mean cumulative abnormal 
returns are in fact negative, -0.84% with a t-value of -2.335, significant at a 1% level, 





associated with the reduction in shareholders’ wealth. The results are shown in Table 4. 
In line with early research on poison pills, relatively negative excess returns support the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis indicating that these measures are adopted in the 
best interest of the incumbent management. Considering the fact that in the United States, 
the management can take the decision in regard to the adoption of the defense without 
shareholders’ approval, negative excess returns are not surprising given the ongoing clash 
between the two groups. By adopting antitakeover amendments, target management 
reduces its employment risk and insulates itself from competition in the takeover market 
(Kesner & Dolton, 1985) (Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993). 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns for the sub-period of 1983 to 1989 are more positive 
(Table 4, Panel A). For the 5 days event window centered on the announcement date, 
mean CAR is slightly positive, 0.40% with a t-value of 3.196, significant at a 1% level. 
Numerous poison pills were adopted from 1986 to 1989; the sample size between the first 
sub-period spanning from January 1983 to March 1986 and the second sub-period from 
January 1983 to December 1989 differs by 1,585 events. 
For the period of 1990 to 1999 and a sample of 3,482 events, the mean cumulative 
abnormal return during the 5 days event window is significantly positive, 2.50% with a t-
value of 19.699. Furthermore, the mean CAR for the period of 2000 to 2010 and a 5 days 
event window is 5.07% with a t-value of 24.914.  The results suggest that throughout the 
years, excess returns become significantly more positive and thus more aligned with 
shareholders’ wealth maximization hypothesis. Despite the fact that in the United States 
shareholders’ approval for the adoption of poison pills is not necessary, the results in 





shareholders. Similarly to full sample results in Table 3, first-time issues demonstrate 
lower abnormal returns upon the announcement than the second-time adopters. In order 
to understand this phenomenon, I run an event study analysis for the Canadian sample 
taking into consideration that in Canada the legislation requires a poison pill to be 
approved by firm’s shareholders, a main distinction from the U.S. market.  
7.1.3. Canada Full Sample Analysis 
The Canadian sample comprises of 672 poison pill announcements. To capture the 
overall effect of shareholder rights plans announcement on shareholders’ wealth, mean 
cumulative abnormal returns for the entire Canadian sample are calculated using the 
market model and the S&P/TSX composite index. It is important to acknowledge that 97 
events were dropped from the event study due to the lack of necessary data, leaving 573 
security-events with useable returns. Time is measured from the event day, which is the 
announcement of the intent to adopt the defence mechanism. The results are shown in 
Table 5. For the event window period [-1, 1], centered on the announcement date, the 
mean cumulative abnormal return is 3.78%, significant at 0.1% level (t-value=4.477).  
Consequently, the null hypothesis, stating that abnormal returns around the event are 
equal to zero, is rejected. The positive value of the abnormal returns supports the 
shareholders’ wealth maximization hypothesis, reporting that managers act in the best 
interest of shareholders provoking a positive market reaction upon the announcement of a 
poison pill. The results are in accordance with the nature of poison pills regime in 
Canada, where target shareholders are granted with the decision making power 
concerning the adoption of the defense mechanisms. Consequently, significantly positive 





regulatory regime aiming at shareholders’ protection. Over a 5 days window, the excess 
returns are reported to be greater, 4.05% with a t-value of 5.100. The Canadian sample’s 
abnormal returns are also higher than their U.S. counterparts, potentially implying that 
Canada has a more shareholder friendly environment. Unlike the U.S., where poison pill 
adoption decisions are made by incumbent management, Canadian companies give full 
decision power to its shareholders, thus establishing a more shareholders’ value-
maximizing approach.  
7.1.4. Canada Sub-Periods Analysis 
To further analyze the Canadian approach, I run an event study for different sub-periods. 
The results are presented in Table 6. For the entire Canadian sample, the results are 
presented in Panel A. The first period spanning from the first poison pill announcement 
by Inco in 1988 to the end of 1989 contains only 6 useable security-events. As a result, 
the returns could be affected by outliers.  Mean cumulative abnormal returns for 3 or 5 
days windows, centered on the announcement date, are 3.69% with t-values of 2.840 and 
2.131 respectively. For the sub-period of 1990 to 1999, the sample consists of 95 events 
and mean excess returns are relatively lower, 1.04% for (-2; 2) event window. For the 
most recent period, 2000 to 2010, abnormal returns are the highest, being 4.66% for the 5 
days event window with a t-value of 4.281 significant at a 0.0001 level. Panel B 
demonstrates the results solely for the first-time Canadian issues. Average excess return 
for the period of 2000 to 2010 is higher when compared to two other sub-periods. For the 
event window spanning from 2 days before to 2 days after the announcement of a poison 
pill, the mean excess return is 6.12% with a t-value of 3.835. In all analyses, the weakest 





7.2. Institutional Ownership  
 In the past decades, a concept of shareholder activism has emerged in the U.S. financial 
market environment. According to Gillan and Starks (2000) the primary role of activist 
shareholders has been to pressure the management of struggling firms to improve on their 
performance, thus striving to increase shareholders value. Shareholder activism by 
institutional investors has become particularly prominent with institutional ownership 
increasing from approximately 24.2% in 1980 to almost 50% by the end of 1994 (Sias & 
Starks, 1998). Consequently, large blockholders were found to take on a progressively a 
more active role as shareholders in U.S. financial markets. With institutional investors 
holding a majority of shares in public U.S. companies, a number of market constraints 
were imposed on target’s ability to use poison pills as a means to maintain company’s 
independence. A growing number of institutional investors revised their passive 
shareholders role to become more active players in the “governance of their corporate 
holdings” (Gillan and Starks, 2000).  It has been demonstrated by Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) that the role of institutional shareholder activism arises due to the conflict of 
interest between company’s managers and shareholders. Revolutionary rules passed by 
the Securities Exchange Commission in 1992 allowed for a direct communication 
between company’s shareholders, thus rejecting a vital need for expensive proxy 
proposals. These measures have also pushed the shareholders to have more direct 
negotiations with company’s management instead of heavily relaying on proxy proposals. 
The evolution of institutional ownership in the U.S. financial market landscape was often 
examined in the context of Berle-Means corporate model. The key characteristic of this 





numerous shareholders, the fragmentation effectively results in a surrender of control of a 
company by the shareholders to its management” (Wingerson & Dorn, 1992).  
An increasing importance of shareholder activism along with a more scrutinized 
approach undertaken by institutional investors could have influenced the poison pill 
adoption process in the United States. Market constraints imposed by institutional 
shareholders on target’s ability to use poison pills and block hostile bids out of self-
interest could have altered the perceived role of poison pills from shareholders’ harming 
device to a bargaining tool. Previous event study results, demonstrate a shift in market 
reaction to poison pill announcement from relatively negative returns over a 5 days 
window centered on the announcement date from 1983 to 1986 period, to strongly 
growing positive abnormal returns in the 1990s and 2000s. Additionally, the increase in 
institutional ownership throughout the years is indisputable. Graph 1 demonstrates the 
mean proportion of institutional ownership in sample target companies in the quarter 
before the announcement date. The increase is non-monotonic, yet on average, in the 
1980s the mean institutional ownership was 38.15%, rising to 40.44% in the 1990s and 
reaching 46.68% in the 2000s.  Institutional ownership increased from about 30% in 1983 
to nearly 50% in 2009, a trend similar to that observed in Sias and Starks (1998).  As 
noted in the event study results, the highest 5 days CAR of 5.07% is found in the period 
of 2000 to 2010. For the same event window, the abnormal returns for the period of 1990 
to 1999 were determined to be 2.50% and 0.40% for the period of 1980-1989.  
A test to establish a possible relationship between the abnormal returns associated with 
the announcement of poison pills and the level of institutional ownership in the adopting 





Investor disclosure in public companies is mandatory as required by securities market 
regulations. The data on institutional holdings of stocks are based on the quarterly reports 
in Form 13F filled to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). It is retrieved from 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database, formerly known as 
CDA/Spectrum 3 4 database and contains ownership information by institutional 
managers with $100 million or more in assets under management.   Institutional investors 
included in the database are insurance companies, investment companies such as mutual 
funds, investment advisors, pension funds, and university endowment funds. Thomson 
Reuters database divides all institutions into five different types:  
Type 1- Commercial Banks; 
Type 2- Insurance Companies; 
Type 3- Investment companies, mainly mutual fund management companies; 
Type 4- Independent Investment Advisors, such as investment banks, asset management 
companies, brokers private wealth management companies, others; 
Type 5- Others (pension funds, university endowment funds, most of hedge funds, etc). 
The U.S. institutional ownership data spans from the first quarter of 1983 to the last 
quarter of 2010. Only stock described as COM, CMA, CMB and CMC are included in 
the sample. 
7.2.1. Influence of Institutional Investors’ ownership and firm characteristics 
on firm’s cumulative abnormal returns  
To establish whether a statistical relationship exists between the proportion of 





with poison pill adoption, I run a number of regressions, controlling for firm’s 
performance and characteristics as well as for governance variables in the fiscal year 
before the poison pill announcement year. The U.S. poison pill sample consists of 2,744 
adoptions of original pills for the period of 1983 to 2010 for which the institutional 
ownership data exists on Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database.  In 
order to avoid any discrepancies in the sample events, companies with an institutional 
ownership of less than 5% and more than 100% are removed. Furthermore, the outlier 
observations of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of more than 30% during 5 days 
window centered on the announcement date and less than -30% were left out from the 
study. In the analysis, I use solely the first-time issues in order to mitigate any effects 
associated with the second-time adoption by the same target company. 
To control for company specific and governance related variables, a second model with 
seven explanatory variables is employed.  
7.2.1.1. Firm Performance and Control Variables 
Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data is used to obtain firm 
specific performance variables. Annual accounting data is utilized to calculate the return-
on- assets (ROA) ratio and Tobin’s Q (Tobin_q). ROA is calculated as the operating 
income before depreciation divided by firm’s total assets (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Barber & Lyon, 1996)  
Tobin’s Q is the market value of firm’s equity and the book value of liabilities divided by 






Consistent with previous research by Khanna and Tice (2005), Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2004), the leverage is computed as total long term debt divided by market value 
of the company.  
A proxy for firm size (Size) is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of firm’s total 
assets. It is particularly important to control for firm size since different antitakeover 
provisions can influence the takeovers of large firms (Agrawal & Mendelker, 1990). 
Additionally, a variable accounting for the amount of dividends ( DVT) paid by the target 
firm is included in the analysis. By paying out dividends, firms shield themselves from 
potential agency problems, since the retention of earnings would have given incumbent 
managers access to large sums without access to investment opportunities and no 
additional monitoring.  
All firm specific characteristics are taken from the fiscal year proceeding the poison pill 
announcement year. 
7.2.1.2. Governance Variables 
Institutional ownership has been the center of many research papers focusing on 
shareholders activism. It has been argued that it can influence the stock reaction to 
antitakeover proposals (Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1994). It is therefore expected that the 
higher level of institutional shareholders will positively affect the stock price reaction 
upon the announcement (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987; Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1994). 
Large institutional investors invest more capital in monitoring expenses and thus increase 
their chance in “uncovering the intended motive for the antitakeover provision” 
(Sundaramurthy, Mahoney, & Mahoney, 1997). Institutional ownership (Instown) is 





the end of the quarter before the poison pill announcement event took place. Total shares 
outstanding (Shrout3) are defined as company's total shares outstanding as of file date 
(fdate).I expect that the abnormal returns associated with the announcement of poison 
pills will be greater for firms with higher proportion of institutional shareholders. 
Governance E index is also included in the multiple regression analysis. Developed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2004), the E index is an entrenchment index based on six provisions: 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden 
parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. A 
strong negative statistical relationship was documented between the entrenchment index 
and large abnormal returns from 1990 to 2003. Each company is assigned a score varying 
from 0 to 6, depending on the number of provisions that the company has in place during 
a given year. Additionally, the authors established an existence of a strong negative 
correlation between IRRC provisions and firm’s stockholder returns during the period of 
1990 to 2003. Based on the nature of the index, I believe it can be used to establish an 
association between shareholders’ wealth and the decision to adopt a poison pill. I 
hypothesize a negative association between mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
and the E-Index, implying that higher levels of entrenching provisions would cause lower 
abnormal returns on the announcement date. 
Summary Statistics are shown in Table 7. The sample size is reduced to 266 observations 
due to inclusion of the E index, for which data spans from 1990 to 2003, additionally; all 
control and governance variables are recorded for the year preceding the announcement 





An OLS regression is run to analyse a relationship between companies’ cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) and the proportion of shares held by institutional owners 
(InstOwn) in the target company. The dependant variable, CARs, is the cumulative 
abnormal return over a 5 days window (-2; 2) centered on the announcement event. The 
explanatory variable, InstOwn, is the proportion of company’s shares held by institutional 
investors in the adopting company. 
CARs= α + β1 (InstOwn) + ε,    (7) 
Additionally, a multiple regression, controlling for firm specific variables and taking into 
account governance variables is run.  
CARs=   α + β1 (InstOwn) + β2 (Tobin’s_Q) + β3 (Size) + β4 (LTD) 
+ β5 (ROA) + β6 (DVT) + β7 (E_Index) + ε,                     (8) 
7.2.2. Empirical Results 
The results for a simple OLS regression demonstrated in Table 7a indicate that the 
coefficient of the explanatory variable, InstOwn, is 0.00727 with a t-value of 1.88. The 
coefficient is positive and marginally significant at a 6% level, suggesting an existence of 
a positive relationship between the abnormal returns documented upon poison pill 
announcement and the proportion of institutional investors in the adopting firm. These 
results lead us to believe that higher levels of institutional ownership in a firm are 
associated with higher abnormal returns on the announcement day. The market perceives 
firms with a higher proportion of institutional investors to be more shareholders oriented 





The results are in line with the shareholders’ wealth maximization hypothesis suggesting 
that poison pills are adopted to increase the bargaining power of the target and benefit its 
shareholders. It can be hypothesized that the rise of institutional ownership in target 
corporations, over the years, positively affected the decisions behind poison pill adoption. 
In other words, better communication which diminished the existing barrier between 
shareholders and the management team resulted in enhanced incentive alignment.  
Model 2 includes solely firm-specific control variables, yielding the results for 1660 
target companies. Only the size (Size) and the long-term debt (LTD) variables appear to 
be significant with a negative coefficient of -0.00321 and a t-value of -1.77 and a positive 
coefficient of 0.01333 and a t-value of 1.70 respectively. Larger firms are often faced 
with greater agency problems indicating a stronger divergence between the interests of 
firm’s shareholders and its management. As suggested by Sundaramurthy et al. (1997), 
large target companies are subject to more negative stock market reaction upon the 
announcement of antitakeover provisions than their smaller counterparts. In fact, 
empirical results suggest that the market may regard various antitakeover provisions to 
“be particularly effective in lowering the probability of a takeover” (Sundaramurthy, 
Mahoney, & Mahoney, 1997). Furthermore, our study suggests that target firms with a 
greater proportion of leverage (LTD) are subject to larger abnormal returns upon the 
announcement of poison pills. James and Bonnie (2003) analyzing the way in which 
poison pill securities and long-term debt affect the level of shareholders wealth also find 
a positive association between CARs and long-term debt, thus suggesting that managers 
who employ both a poison pill and higher debt levels benefit from greater bargaining 





targets with large levels of debt either through higher premiums to target shareholders or 
direct payments to target bondholders. Additionally, Stulz (1988) demonstrates that target 
shareholders “receive higher bids as debt levels increase”. A positive association found in 
our study is therefore in line with previous empirical results.  
Model 3 is a multiple regression which includes firm-specific and governance variables, 
except for the institutional ownership (InstOwn) explanatory variable. The sample size 
comprises of 259 events due to the inclusion of the entrenchment index (E_Index). A 
negative coefficient of Tobin’s Q, β= -0.00310 with a t-value of -2.68, significant at a 1% 
level establishes a negative relation between the explanatory variable and the dependent 
abnormal returns variable (CARs).  
Alongside, the entrenchment index (E_Index) has a negative coefficient of -0.00316 with 
a t-value of -2.00, significant at a 5% level. The negative relation confirms the 
hypothesized association between the explanatory and the dependant variable, indicating 
that higher amount of defensive provisions in the target firm result in lower abnormal 
returns upon poison pill announcement. 
Model 5 includes all company-specific and governance explanatory variables. A great 
number of events are dropped due to the inclusion of the E-Index, leaving 259 useable 
CARs. The regression results for model 5, described in Table 7a, suggest that the 
coefficient of the institutional ownership (InstOwn) became more significant β1=0.02131 
with a t-value of 2.59. A strong statistical relationship between the proportion of 
institutional investors and the abnormal returns around the announcement date could 





Graph 1 suggests a rising trend in the percentage of institutional investors in poison pill 
adopting companies.  I expect that higher entrenchment index scores will be associated 
with more negative abnormal returns during the announcement window.  True to the 
hypothesis, a negative statistically significant coefficient of the E Index (β= -0.00310) 
with a t-value of -1.98, significant at a 5% level, confirms an existence of a negative 
relationship between the abnormal returns and the entrenchment index. Higher E index 
scores indicate a higher degree of managerial protection from the discipline of the 
takeover market (John & Litov, 2010), thus higher levels are related to stronger 
managerial entrenchment. The regression results confirm that firms with lower abnormal 
returns around the poison pill adoption date are characterized by a highly entrenched 
incumbent management. The R
2
 along with the adjusted R
2
 for Model 5 are 7.34% and 
4.75% respectively, while the model is significant at a 1% level with the F-value of 2.84. 
Simple and multiple regressions employing a dummy for institutional ownership variable 
are run as robustness tests in order to control for linearity. Table 7b, shows the regression 
results for two scenarios: 
1) Institutional Ownership is equal to 1 if Instown ≥ 50%, meaning that at least 50% of 
target firm’s outstanding shares are held by institutional investors; and is equal to 0 if the 
proportion of institutional investors is less than 50% ( Instown < 50%); 
2) Institutional Ownership is equal to 1 if Instown ≥ 43%, which is the median 
institutional ownership proportion in our sample and is equal to 0 if the proportion of 





The robustness results indicate that when the institutional ownership’s dummy uses a 
threshold of 50%, in the simple OLS regression, the explanatory variable is positive with 
a coefficient of 0.00338 and t-value of 1.97, statistically significant at a 5% level. These 
results are consistent with the ones obtained for Model 1, where Instown is the proportion 
of target’s outstanding shares owned by institutional shareholders. Conversely, when the 
dummy is used with a threshold being the median institutional ownership of 43%, 
regression results are not found to be significant (Model 1b). 
After establishing that a positive statistical relationship exists between the abnormal 
company returns and the proportion of institutional shareholders in the adopting 
company, additional event study analysis, distinguishing between firms with minority and 
majority institutional ownership is performed in order to analyze the extent to which a 
higher proportion of institutional shareholders affect company’s excess returns around the 
announcement dates. The results are presented in Table 8. For firms where institutional 
investors hold between 5% and 49% of company’s shares (minority group), the mean 
cumulative abnormal return during a 5 days window centered on the announcement date 
is 0.91% with a t-value of 4.398, significant at a 0.001 significance level. Conversely, 
mean cumulative abnormal return for companies where institutional shareholders are 
dominant (more than 50%), is 1.37% with a t-value of 4.487 for the same event window. 
These results suggest higher excess returns for firms with majority institutional investors 
when compared with firms with a lower level of institutional shareholders. The mean 
differences t-test is performed to establish whether any statistical difference between the 
results of the two groups exists. The results from Table 8a indicate that the difference 





7.3. Takeover activity prior to and following poison pill adoption by 
target companies 
 
The American M&A market is far more buoyant than the Canadian landscape. The 
statistics demonstrated in Table 9 suggest that 134 American companies which adopted a 
poison pill between January 1980 and December 2010 received at least one tender offer 
in the 12 months preceding the adoption date, while 119 U.S. companies received at least 
one tender offer in the 12 months following the adoption of the takeover defense 
mechanism. Conversely, only 15 Canadian companies were subject to a tender offer in 
the 12 months prior to the adoption date and 13 companies in the year following the 
poison pill adoption. 
It is salient to note that U.S. tender offers received in the pre-adoption period mainly had 
a friendly attitude (71.64%) implying that the raider generally informs the board of 
directors about the forthcoming offer made for the outstanding shares of the target 
company. Following the tip, the target board of directors can advise its shareholders on 
the future steps regarding bid acceptance or rejection. If target shareholders are advised to 
accept the offer made by the acquirer, the tender offer is considered to be of a friendly 
fashion. The amount of friendly tender offers in the United States increased from 72% in 
the pre-adoption period to nearly 90% in the post-adoption phase. The growth of friendly 
tender offers is logical as once the pill is put in place it is more expensive for the raider to 
acquire all remaining outstanding shares of the company without the consent of target 
board of directors. In the United States, unlike Canada, the board is in full control of the 
poison pill that they adopt and therefore can decide whether the pill should be triggered 





the raider would be more inclined to negotiate with the management in a friendly fashion 
to avoid swallowing the pill. A decline in the number of hostile and unsolicited tenders 
offers in the United States highlights the nature of poison pill landscape in the country. 
The number of hostile tender offers decreased from 31% to 6.72% of the total number of 
tender offers received by the target in the United States. A hostile tender offer involves 
the acquirer to make an offer for all controlling shares in the target company directly to 
target shareholders. A key characteristic of the hostile tender offer as opposed to the 
friendly nature of the bid is the target management’s resistance to the offer. As a result, in 
order to prevent the occurrence of hostile tender offers, the target management would 
often issue defense mechanisms, such as poison pill. It is believed that with the defense in 
place, the raiders would be more likely to enter in conversation directly with the target 
management to avoid bearing any significant acquisition costs.  The proportion of 
unsolicited bids remains relatively the same for the American sample, so does the 
proportion of neutral tender offers.  
The Canadian sample presents different results. The proportion of friendly tender offers 
decreased from nearly 87% in the pre-adoption period to 69% in the post-adoption 
period, while the proportion of hostile offers increased by 23%. This distinction in the 
takeover landscape of the two countries can be explained by the difference in the policies 
associated with poison pill defense strategies. In Canada, as opposed to the United States, 
target shareholders play the main role in the defense adoption process, meaning that it is 
the shareholders who decide whether to entertain a hostile acquisition proposal. 
Additionally, in Canada, it is not possible for the target to “just say no” to the hostile 





tender offer, the raiders bypass the target management by communicating directly with 
the shareholders. As the result, an increase in hostile tender offers and a decline of 
friendly offers is entirely justified for firms that have put a defense mechanism in place. 
A poison pill pushed the raider to negotiate directly with the shareholders, bypassing the 
management team, since in Canada all decisions associated with the defense adoption are 
undertaken by firm’s shareholders. These results support the earlier introduced 
hypothesis about different environments and poison pill adoption processes in the United 
States and Canada.  
8. Conclusion 
 
Since the emergence of shareholder rights plans in 1982 in the United States, they came 
into widespread practice around the globe allowing corporations to protect themselves 
against hostile raiders. Despite the optimistic idea behind the defense usage, an important 
proportion of financial world believes that by swallowing the pill, target corporations are 
doomed to experience negative effects.  This ongoing debate sparked the birth of two 
opposing hypotheses: the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, which states that upon the 
defense adoption managers act in their best interest causing the announcement news to 
ignite a negative market reaction; and the shareholders’ wealth maximization hypotheses 
arguing that the pill is adopted in the best interest of target shareholders and thus causes a 
positive market reaction upon announcement news. 
The ultimate goal of poison pills is to protect target shareholders from hostile bidders and 





legal regimes greatly influence the use and the nature of the defenses. In the United 
States, the decision power regarding the adoption of poison pills lies with incumbent 
management, which can choose to adopt the pill without shareholders’ consent.  
Conversely, in the Canadian market, the final decision on whether to adopt the pill is 
taken by target shareholders.  Event studies demonstrating abnormal returns upon the 
announcement of poison pills by U.S. and Canadian corporations revealed that in fact the 
market reaction in Canada is positive and is stronger than in the U.S. sample arguing that 
the Canadian landscape is more shareholders oriented and the shareholder rights plans are 
adopted with the purpose of increasing the takeover premium received from corporate 
raiders. 
Another interesting observations lies in the U.S. sample results. Early literature focusing 
on poison pill adoption documented a negative reaction on the announcement day. I find 
that  in the early 1980s the market reacted negatively to poison pill adoption news, 
supporting  the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, yet the event study results 
demonstrate that in 1990s and 2000s a shift towards more positive abnormal returns, thus 
favoring the shareholders wealth maximization hypothesis.  
A regression analysis reveals that higher level of institutional ownership is partially 
responsible for more positive abnormal returns upon the announcement of poison pills. 
The higher the level of institutional investors in the target firm, the more positive the 
abnormal events are for the U.S. first time defense adopters. 
I believe that this study demonstrates revolutionary results on the U.S. and Canadian 





the adoption of poison pills by the U.S. and Canadian corporations to further investigate 
whether the implementation of these defenses positively affected the target shareholders. 
Furthermore, other factors potentially affecting the switch to positive market reaction in 
the United States could be investigated, such as the managerial compensation and other 
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Number of poison pill announcements from January 1
st
, 1983 through December 31
st
, 
2010 in Canada and United States 
 
 United States 
 
Canada 
Total number of poison pill 
announcements, as retrieved 
from the SDC database 
 
8,862 672 
Total number of events deleted 
because of overlap with tender 
offer events 
12 2 
Total number of events dropped 
during the event study due to the 
lack of stock returns data 
 
932 97 
Total number of poison pill 
announcements used for analysis 
7,918 573 
Total number of first issue 
poison pills less unusable events 
 
3,780 381 
Total Number of Second and 

















Total number of poison pill announcements from January 1983 to December 2010, 
broken down by year 
 United States Canada 
Year 
Total Number of Poison Pill 
Announcements 
% of Sample 





1983 3 0.03% 0 0.00% 
1984 7 0.08% 0 0.00% 
1985 42 0.47% 0 0.00% 
1986 352 3.97% 0 0.00% 
1987 196 2.21% 0 0.00% 
1988 593 6.69% 2 0.30% 
1989 619 6.98% 7 1.04% 
1990 361 4.07% 5 0.74% 
1991 196 2.21% 2 0.30% 
1992 117 1.32% 7 1.04% 
1993 107 1.21% 3 0.45% 
1994 183 2.06% 3 0.45% 
1995 325 3.67% 9 1.34% 
1996 599 6.76% 15 2.23% 
1997 551 6.22% 24 3.57% 
1998 740 8.35% 27 4.02% 
1999 680 7.67% 21 3.13% 
2000 481 5.43% 13 1.93% 
2001 524 5.91% 20 2.98% 
2002 422 4.76% 20 2.98% 
2003 302 3.41% 13 1.93% 
2004 192 2.17% 22 3.27% 
2005 197 2.22% 45 6.70% 
2006 218 2.46% 70 10.42% 
2007 197 2.22% 75 11.16% 
2008 251 2.83% 99 14.73% 
2009 240 2.71% 65 9.67% 
2010 167 1.88% 105 15.63% 
Total 8,862 100.00% 672 100.00% 
*The sample includes both first-time and second-time adopters of shareholder rights plans for the sample 







Total number of poison pill announcements from January 1983 to December 2010, 
broken down by sub-period 
 
 
United States Canada 
Sub-Period Number of Poison Pill 
Announcements 
% of Sample Number of Poison 
Pill Announcements 
% of Sample 
1983-1989 1,812 20.45% 9 1.34% 
1990-1999 3,859 43.55% 116 17.26% 
2000-2010 3,191 36.01% 547 81.40% 
 
Table 3 
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for U.S. sample at the announcement of poison pills 
in the period of 1983-2010 








Patell Z Portfolio 
Time-Series t 
 
(A) All U.S. Issues 
 
(-1,+1) 7918 2.57% 1.92% 40.824*** 35.620*** 
(-2,+2) 7918 2.93% 2.19% 36.045*** 31.380*** 
(+3,+10) 7903 0.44% 0.20% 2.670**  3.738** 
 
(B) First-Time U.S. Issues 
 
(-1,+1) 3780 0.63% 0.39% 5.502*** 5.493*** 
(-2,+2) 3780 0.96% 0.61% 6.626*** 6.435*** 
(+3,+10) 3779 0.61% 0.36% 3.112* 3.327* 
 
(C) Non-First-Time U.S. Issues 
 
(-1,+1) 4138 4.34% 3.19% 51.139*** 43.007*** 
(-2,+2) 4138 4.72% 3.51% 43.471*** 36.221*** 
(+3,+10) 4132 0.28% 0.07% 0.698 1.704$ 
* “All U.S. Issues” group includes first-time and second-time U.S. poison pill announcements. First-time 
adopters are firms which had not previously adopted any poison pills. Non-first-time issuers are companies 
that either replaced or extended the pill scheduled to expire. Mean cumulative abnormal returns are stock 
returns of the firm less the value weighted index. The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols 







Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns per Sub-Period 













t-value Mean CARs t-value 
 




1983- March 1986 
(Replica of  Malatesta 
Study N=127)  
1983-1989 ( N=1713) 1990-1999 (N=3482) 2000-2010 (N=2723) 
(-40,-2) 








-0.84% -2.335** 0.40% 3.196** 2.50% 19.699*** 5.07% 
24.914*
** 
(+3,+10) 0.44% 0.964 0.24% 1.505 0.23% 1.425 0.84% 3.274** 
 




1983- March 1986 
(Replica of  Malatesta 
Study N=2) 
1983-1989 ( N=1193) 1990-1999 (N=1782) 2000-2010 (N=805) 
(-40,-2) -5.78% 0.5597 3.49% 7.982*** 0.00% 0.008 0.91% 0.740 
(-1,+1) 




-3.70% 0.2968 0.25% 1.580$ 1.11% 5.240*** 1.30% 
3.824**
* 
(+3,+10) -9.55% 0.0334** 0.35% 1.541 0.54% 2.005* 1.17% 2.109* 
 




1983- March 1986 
(Replica of  Malatesta 
Study N=125) 
1983-1989 ( N=520) 1990-1999 (N=1700) 2000-2010 (N=1918) 
(-40,-2) 
3.61% 0.0002** 4.86% 8.131*** 3.66% 8.121*** 2.32% 3.619** 
(-1,+1) 




-0.64% 0.0690* 0.75% 3.496** 3.95% 24.478*** 6.48% 
28.185*
** 
(+3,+10) 0.51% 0.2547 -0.04% -0.135 -0.09% -0.458 0.70% 2.404* 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns are stock returns of the firm less the value weighted index.  First-Time 
U.S. Adopters sample consists uniquely of first poison pill issues by corporations included in the sample. 
Non-first-time U.S. adopters sample encompasses all events recorded as non-first time plans. The symbols 
$,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 
generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction and generic one-









Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Canadian sample in the period of 1988-2010 













(A) All Canadian events ( N= 573) 
 
(-1,+1) 3.78% 1.99% 8.150*** 2.760** 4.477*** 
(-2,+2) 4.05% 2.39% 7.578*** 2.842** 5.100*** 
(+3,+10) 1.12% 1.20% 3.005** 1.205 2.348** 
 
(B) First-Time Issues ( N=381) 
 
(-1,+1) 4.81% 2.34% 7.029*** 3.552*** 4.090*** 
(-2,+2) 5.04% 2.80% 6.488*** 3.446*** 4.561*** 
(+3,+10) 1.38% 1.29% 2.362** 0.767 2.029* 
 
(C) Non-First-Time Issues ( N=192) 
 
(-1,+1) 1.76% 1.47% 4.182*** 1.290$ 2.298* 
(-2,+2) 2.09% 1.80% 3.957*** 1.580$ 2.553** 
(+3,+10) 0.60% 1.08% 1.862* 1.465$ 1.767* 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns are stock returns of the firm less the value weighted index.  First-Time 
Canadian adopters sample consists uniquely of first poison pill issues by corporations included in the 
sample. Non-first-time Canadian adopters sample encompasses all events recorded as non-first time plans. 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the 
















Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Canadian firms divided by sub-period 
 (Market Model and Value-Weighted Index) 
 
Event Window Mean CAR t-value Mean CAR t-value Mean CAR t-value 
(A) All Canadian Events 
Event 
Window/Subperiod 
1988-1989 ( N=6) 1990-1999 (N=95) 2000-2010 (N=472) 
(-1,+1) 3.69% 2.840** 0.69% 2.013** 4.39% 3.839*** 
(-2,+2) 3.69% 2.131** 1.04% 2.657** 4.66% 4.281*** 
(+3,+10) -0.88% -0.522 1.43% 1.554$ 1.08% 1.957* 
 




1988-1989 ( N=5) 1990-1999 (N=75) 2000-2010 (N=301) 
(-1,+1) 4.17% 2.709** 0.60% 1.745* 5.38% 3.483*** 
(-2,+2) 4.46% 2.356** 0.76% 2.133* 6.12% 3.835*** 
(+3,+10) -1.18% -0.619 0.92% 1.145 1.53% 1.801* 
 




1988-1989 ( N=1) 1990-1999 (N=20) 2000-2010 (N=171) 
(-1,+1) 1.30% . 1.02% 1.074 1.85% 2.076* 
(-2,+2) -0.15% . 2.08% 1.671$ 2.10% 2.194* 
(+3,+10) 0.58% . 3.35% 1.099 0.28% 1.468$ 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns are stock returns of the firm less the value weighted index.  First-Time 
Canadian adopters sample consists uniquely of first poison pill issues by corporations included in the 
sample. Non-first-time Canadian adopters sample encompasses all events recorded as non-first time plans. 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the 


















Summary statistics of firm specific variables for first-time U.S. issues for the period of 
January 1982 to December 2010 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
CAR 266 -0.002 0.0302 -0.1148 0.1040 
Institutional ownership 266 0.4148 0.2253 0.05 0.9710 
Tobin_Q 265 2.1816 1.8685 0.6036 14.4789 
Size 266 2.8408 0.527 1.6456 4.5032 
LTDscaled 265 0.1286 0.1298 0 0.5804 
E_Index 266 1.6391 1.2214 0 6 
DVT 266 14.925 32.681 0 179.323 

























































































































































Multiple Regression Analysis 
Model 1 is the simple least-square regression showing the mean shareholders’ wealth effect of initial 
poison pill issues announced in the period of 1983-2011. The announcement dates were taken from the 
SDC database. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CARs) over a 5 days window 
(2;2) centred on the announcement day. To estimate the CARs a market model along with the CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio during the year (trading days - 255 to - 46) prior to the pill adoption was used. 
An independent variable measures the proportion of institutional investor’s ownership in the adopting 
company in the quarter before the adoption date (Instown). 
Model 5 is a multiple regression, controlling for company specific characteristics, as well as for the 
governance related E index. Among firm specific, control variables, are the long-term debt scaled by the 
market value of company (LTD) , a proxy for firm size (Size) calculated by taking the natural logarithm of 
firm’s total assets.  Firm’s growth (Tobin’s q), is calculated as the sum of market value of firm’s equity and 
the book value of liabilities divided by firm’s total assets. Firm’s level of profitability (ROA) is calculated 
as the operating income before depreciation divided by firm’s total assets 
The dividends (DVT) variable represents the amount of dividends paid by the target firm. The entrenchment 
index (E_Index) is an index developed by Bebchuk et al. (2004) and represents the level of managerial 
entrenchment with its values varying from 0 to 6, depending on the number of provisions. 
All firm specific characteristics are taken from the fiscal year preceding the announcement year. 
Variable 
Model 1: 






























β = -0.00154 
t-value = -0.84 
(0.4001) 
β = 0.00819 
t-value=1.78 
(0.0758) 
β = -0.00349 
t-value= -0.28 
(0.7821) 
β = 0.00506 
t-value= 1.02 
(0.3101) 






β = 0.00727 
t-value = 1.88 
(0.0597) 
. . 
β = 0.00779 
t-value= 1.65 
(0.0994) 





β = -0.00073197 
t-value= -1.17 
(p-value=0.2423) 
β = -0.00310 
t-value = -2.68 
(0.0079) 
β = -0.00093019 
t-value= -1.53 
(0.2072) 
β = -0.00308 






β = -0.00321 
t-value=-1.77 
(0.0772) 
β = 0.00564 
t-value = 1.33 
(0.1847) 
β = -0.00079061 
t-value=-1.77 
(0.0768) 
β = 0.00635 




β = 0.01333 
t-value= 1.70 
(0.0893) 
β = -0.01749 
t-value = -1.31 
(0.2649) 
β = 0.01300 
t-value= 1.66 
(0.0974) 
β = -0.01658 




β = -0.00549 
t-value= -1.01 
(0.3128) 
β = -0.00035684 
t-value = -1.12 
(0.9827) 
β = -0.00553 
t-value= -1.02 
(0.3087) 
β = -0.00162 




β = 0.00004736 
t-value= 1.00 
(0.3189) 
β = -0.00003307 
t-value= -0.41 
(0.6800) 
β = 0.00004659 
t-value= -1.26 
(0.3265) 




 . . 




β = -0.00310 
t-value = -1.98 
(0.0487) 











Adj.R2 0.0009 0.0020 0.0259 0.0030 0.0475 
R2 0.0013 0.0050 0.0486 0.0066 0.0734 






Robustness table: Institutional Ownership as a dummy variable 
Model 1 is the simple least-square regression showing the mean shareholders’ wealth effect of initial 
poison pill issues announced in the period of 1983-2011. The announcement dates were taken from the 
SDC database. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CARs) over a 5 days window 
(2;2) centred on the announcement of the poison pill. To estimate the CARs a market model along with the 
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio during the year (trading days - 255 to - 46) prior to the pill adoption 
was used. 
An independent variable measures the proportion of institutional investor’s ownership in the adopting 
company in the quarter before the adoption date (Instown). 
Model 1a: Institutional Ownership dummy is equal to 1 if institutional ownership is greater than 50% and 0 
otherwise. 
Model 1b: Institutional Ownership dummy is equal to 1 if institutional ownership is greater than the median 
value of 43% and is 0 otherwise. 
Model 4a and Model 5a use the institutional ownership dummy where the dummy is equal to 1 if 
institutional ownership is greater than the median of 43% and 0 otherwise. 
Model 4b and Model 5b use the institutional ownership dummy where the dummy is equal to 1 if 
institutional ownership is greater than 50% and 0 otherwise. 
Models 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b are multiple regressions, controlling for company specific characteristics, as well 
as for the governance related E index. Among firm specific, control variables, are the long-term debt scaled 
by the market value of company (LTD) , a proxy for firm size (Size) calculated by taking the natural 
logarithm of firm’s total assets.  Firm’s growth (Tobin’s q), is calculated as the sum of marketvalue of 
firm’s equity and the book value of liabilities divided by firm’s total assets. Firm’s level of profitability 
(ROA) is calculated as the operating income before depreciation divided by firm’s total assets 
The dividends (DVT) variable represents the amount of dividends paid by the target firm in the fiscal year 
proceeding the announcement year. The entrenchment index (E_Index) is an index developed by Bebchuk 
et al. (2004) and represents the level of managerial entrenchment with its values varying from 0 to 6, 
depending on the number of provisions. 
All firm specific characteristics are taken from the fiscal year preceding the announcement year. 
 











































t-value = 0.29 
(0.7719) 
β = 0.00724 
t-value =1.56 
(0.1200) 
β = -0.00677 
t-value = -0.54 
(0.5922) 
β = 0.00688 
t-value = 1.47 
(0.1424) 








β = 0.00338 
t-value = 1.97 
(0.0486) 
β = 0.00241 
t-value = 1.46 
(0.1449) 
β = 0.00299 
t-value =1.44 
(0.1509) 
β = 0.00715 
t-value = 1.86 
(0.0635) 
β = 0.00309 
t-value = 1.53 
(0.1256) 










β = -0.00305 




t-value = -1.24 
(0.2148) 








β = -0.00323 
t-value=-1.78 
(0.0755) 
β = 0.00561 
t-value = 1.34 
(0.1799) 
β = -0.00321 
t-value = -1.77 
(0.0777) 
















































β = 0.01298 
t-value=1.66 
(0.0979) 
β = -0.01768 
t-value = -1.15 
(0.2521) 
β = 0.01277 
t-value = 1.63 
(0.1039) 









β = -0.00523 
t-value=-0.98 
(0.3258) 
β = 0.00230 
t-value = 0.14 
(0.8879) 
β = -0.00563 
t-value = -1.04 
(0.3007) 






























.  . 
β = -0.00309 



























Adj.R2 0.0011 0.0004 0.0026 0.0341 0.0028 0.0289 
R2 0.0014 0.0008 0.0062 0.0600 0.0064 0.0550 

















Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for U.S. first-time issues at the announcement of 
poison pills in the period of 1983-2010, broken down by the level of institutional 
ownership 
(Market Model and Value-Weighted Index) 
 
Event Window N Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Portfolio Time-Series t Patell Z 
 
(A) Event Study Results for firms with minority institutional ownership (5% - 49%) 
 
(-2;2) 1695 0.91% 4.398*** 3.734*** 
(-1;1) 1695 0.53% 3.358** 3.009** 
(0; 0) 1695 0.07% 0.723 0.636 
 
(B) Event Study Results for firms with majority institutional ownership (50% - 100%) 
 
(-2;2) 1054 1.37% 4.487*** 4.487*** 
(-1;1) 1054 0.85% 3.125** 3.612*** 
(0; 0) 1054 0.37% 2.789** 2.652** 
Firms with minority institutional ownership are those where institutional shareholders hold between 5% 
and 49% of company’s shares. Firms with majority institutional ownership are those where institutional 
shareholders hold between 50% and 100% of company’s shares. Mean cumulative abnormal returns are 
stock returns of the firm less the value weighted index. The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols 

















(0; 0) 0.37% 0.07% 0.30% 
Equal var:      -1.54 (0.1234) 
Unequal var:  -1.55 (0.1218) 
1.04 (0.5160) 
(-1;1) 0.85% 0.53% 0.32% 
Equal var:       1.05 (0.2921) 
Unequal var:  1.05( 0.2921) 
1.01 ( 0.8844) 
(-2;2) 1.37% 0.91% 0.46% 
Equal var:       1.22 ( 0.2331) 
Unequal var:  1.18( 0.2417) 








Attitude of Tender Offers Received by Target Firms Prior to and Post Poison Pill 
Adoption 
Deal Attitude Canada United States 
(A) Pre-Adoption Period: Tender Offers Received up to 12 months before the adoption of a poison pill 
Friendly 13 86.67% 96 71.64% 
Hostile 0 0.00% 31 23.13% 
Unsolicited 2 13.33% 3 2.24% 
Neutral 0 0.00% 4 2.99% 
Total 15 100.00% 134 100.00% 
(B) Post-Adoption Period: Tender Offers Received up to 12 months after the adoption of a poison pill 
Friendly 9 69.23% 106 89.08% 
Hostile 3 23.08% 8 6.72% 
Unsolicited 1 7.69% 3 2.52% 
Neutral 0 0.00% 2 1.68% 





















Takeover Activity of Target Firms Following the Adoption of Poison Pills 
 
 
Canada United States 
Total Number of Companies in the 
sample 
452 companies 4,238 companies 
Total number of poison pills 






Total Number of Companies for 
which only second time adoption data 
is available 
24 companies 454 companies 
Total number of companies which 
received at least one tender offer 





Total number of companies which 
received one tender offer within 12 





Total number of companies which 
received two tender offers within 12 





Total Number of Companies which 
received at least one tender offer 
within 12 months prior to the 
adoption 




* A total of 452 Canadian companies and 4,238 American companies were found to adopt a poison pill. 
Some companies were found to adopt more than one pill throughout the sample period, thus yielding 672 
poison pill adoptions by Canadian companies and 8,862 adoptions by American companies. 
 
 
 
 
